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In this paper we read Keynes’s “General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money” from the point of view of the main causes of the economic crisis in general 
and particularly the present world economic crisis. We compare Keynes’s approach 
to the crisis with the work of contemporary distinguished economists. We conclude 
that a drop of marginal effi ciency of capital is the main cause of the economic 
crisis and depression, and that such a drop is an unavoidable consequence of 
functioning of a market capitalist economy. Such a view differs signifi cantly from 
the deliberations of many economists who hold insuffi cient demand as the main 
cause of the crisis. We think that insuffi cient demand appears on the surface as a 
cause of the crisis. However, insuffi cient demand is just a consequence of a 
previously overheated economy faced with the drop of MEC. Consequently, a crisis 
cannot be prevented by expansive fi nancial policy. Therefore it should come as a 
surprise that Keynes in the last year of his life retreated from his ideas expressed in 
“General Theory” and declared himself as not Keynesian any more (Hutchison, 
1981).We think that major systemic, institutional as well as structural changes 
need to be taken in majority of developed economies in order to cope effi ciently 
with present and future crisis.
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1. Introduction
Insuffi cient aggregate demand is taken by the administrations of many countries and 
many economists, as the main cause of the current world economic crisis. Therefore, 
economic thought of J.M. Keynes has come again to the forefront of economic 
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knowledge. Following Keynes theory of insuffi cient demand (as they understood 
it) many economists such as Krugman (2007), Stiglitz (2007), Vade (2008), Swartz-
Nelson (2007), Friedman (in Swartz-Nelson, 2007), Ben Bernanke (2002), C. Romer 
(2002), Pitelis-Argites (2008), Crotty (2008) identifi ed the present crisis as a crisis 
caused by insuffi cient demand.
On the other hand, a few economists such as J. Taylor, (2009), or K.Rogoff-Reinchart 
(2008), point out that recession is usually preceded by aggregate over absorption.
Different interpretations of the causes of crisis require different economic prescription. 
If we take insuffi cient demand as the most important disease of an economy, does it 
mean that the crisis might be fi xed (prevented) by additional demand? Or does the 
crisis fi xing require more deep systemic changes in times of severe crisis such as the 
present recession often compared to the Great Depression, as we suggest?
Since the crisis can hardly be solved and depressions prevented by monetary and 
fi scal relief measures, it is high time politicians were at work on national and world-
wide level searching for a new political-economic solution. 
In the paper we try to follow the main thought on economic crisis offered by Keynes 
himself. We extensively use Keynes’ quotes because of the delicate subject matter of 
the paper and different approach to Keynes’ thought. We offer our understanding of 
Keynes’ thought on economic crisis and its causes. Then we deduce his mechanism 
from economic crisis and depression. Finally, we conclude, on the basis of comparison 
of Keynes’ economic deliberations and the economics facts expounded by Taylor, 
Rogoff, Ellsworth, and Marx that throughout history, deep economic crises have 
been caused mainly by a drop of MEC. Hardly might a drop of MEC be tackled 
effi ciently from the ‘centre’ without provoking lasting stagfl ation, exactly as Keynes 
did conclude in 1937 (Hutchison, 1981). Rarely may stagfl ation be a lasting solution 
to any crises. Consequently, refl ecting to the new crisis situation in G. Britain in 
1937 Keynes pointed out that budget defi cit became useless remedy for a stagnant 
economy. He concluded that for a new stage of economic dynamics stimulation from 
the centre becomes counterproductive. Therefore, Keynes suggests that a new stage 
of economic recovery requires a new technique (Hutchison, 1981: 115-116). 
Our opinion is that the present world fi nancial crisis is both fi nancial and structural-
functional crisis of the capitalist way of production. The present crisis, expressed in 
Marx’s language, might be depicted as a crisis in which “global material productive 
forces of society (have) come into confl ict with existing relations of production(…) 
from forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their 
fetters”(Buzaglo, 2009). The dynamics of MEC is closely connected with the 
dynamics of a reproduction process.MEC is an expression of business climate of an 
economy at a given stage of a business cycle. The stage of a business cycle refl ects 
relations of productive forces and productive relations. Therefore, we think that 
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MEC deserves a particular attention to be paid in giving explanation of an economic 
crisis both from a micro and macro-economic perspective. Consequently, we think 
that deep and structural changes need to be made in the present system of a market 
capitalist economy in order to avoid the possibility of a great economic crash in 
the future. Hardly might the measures of an economic policy directed to increase 
the alleged insuffi cient demand be welcomed as a lasting solution to a systemic, 
structural and functional economic crisis.
2. Controversial issues of insuffi cient demand approach
In an attempt to trace thoughts of economists on insuffi cient demand, we have found 
that the main causes of insuffi cient demand might be classifi ed as follows:
-  Insuffi cient demand is caused by both low level of personal and investment 
spending in relation to GDP (Krugman, 2006,2007; Stiglitz, 2007; Vade, 2008; 
Bernanke, 2002).
-  Insuffi cient demand is primarily caused by wrong macroeconomic management-
restrictive monetary policy (Bernanke,2002; Romer, 2002; Friedman in Swartz-
Nelson, 2007; Swartz-Nelson, 2007).
-  Insuffi cient demand is caused either in a two-class model by inadequate consumption 
of workers or in a three-class model by insuffi cient consumption of fi nancial reinters 
(Crotty, 2006,2008; Pitelis-Argities, 2006,2008; Orhongazi, 2007).
-  Insuffi cient spending is a consequence of asymmetric information, moral hazard 
and inadequate systemic regulation (Stiglitz, 2007).
It sounds highly surprisingly that between afore mentioned economist no one has 
pointed out to marginal effi ciency of capital as a main cause of economic slump 
stressed out by Keynes theory and confi rmed by economic reality of 1861(Marx), or 
1929 (Ellsworth,1950). 
Should we, for a moment, take the thesis of insuffi cient demand as correct, we 
may pose the following question in order to test the validity of the proposition of 
insuffi cient demand:
-  How is it possible for an economy to be confronted with the balance of payments 
defi cit and infl ation if under-consumption in the economy persists and precedes the 
crisis,(see data for the USA and other developed economies prepared by Rogoff-
Reinchart, 2008 and Taylor , 2009). 
-  How is it possible that an economy faces a sudden drop in assets prices just by 
changed expectations? How comes that the expectations are suddenly changed?
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-  How is it possible that personal consumption drops in time of full employment 
bearing in mind that according to all economic schools of thought full employment 
provides the highest level of wages? Where does demand defi ciency come from: 
workers (citizens), investors, renters?
- Why does an economy experience a drop in investment unless it is caused by fall 
in marginal effi ciency of capital (MEC)?
- What factors bring about a fall in MEC: is it insuffi cient demand or eventually an 
overheated economy as suggested by Keynes himself?
On the other hand, J. Taylor in his article (2009) deliberates on the main causes of 
an economic crisis as follows: “The classic explanation of fi nancial crises, going 
back hundreds of years, is that they are caused by excesses—frequently monetary 
excesses—which lead to a boom and an inevitable bust. In the recent crisis we had 
a housing boom and bust which in turn led to fi nancial turmoil in the United States 
and other countries. I begin by showing that monetary excesses were the main cause 
of that boom and the resulting bust” (Taylor, 2009).
A similar thought to Taylor’s has been expressed by Rogoff-Reinchart (2008). They 
wonder whether the 2007-2008 U.S. sub-prime mortgage fi nancial crisis is truly a 
new and different phenomena. Our examination of the longer historical record fi nds 
stunning qualitative and quantitative parallels to 18 earlier post-war banking crises 
in industrialized countries. Specifi cally, the run-up in U.S. equity and housing prices 
(which, for countries experiencing large capital infl ows, stands out as the best leading 
indicator in the fi nancial crisis literature) closely tracks the average of the earlier 
crises. Another important parallel is the inverted v-shape curve for output growth 
the U.S. experienced as its economy slowed on the eve of the crisis. Among other 
indicators, the run-up in U.S. public debt is actually somewhat below the average of 
other episodes, and its pre-crisis infl ation level is also lower. On the other hand, the 
U.S. current account defi cit trajectory is worse than average.”(See graphs 1 and 2)
Our understanding of Keynes’ theory of business cycles, Keynes (1964), and 
the empirical data from the XIX century (Marx, Vol.III :448, 426), and from the 
economic crash of 1929 (Ellsworth,1950) suggests that the crisis can hardly be 
cured by increasing demand. Moreover, increasing demand might provoke world-
wide stagfl ation. In this respect let us mention some relevant observations pointed 
out by P.T.Ellswort which support an attitude that the 1929 economic crisis was 
provoked by a drop of MEC rather than by a drop of demand: “The whole economy 
has been saturated. Capacities of auto industry in 1929 were developed far above 
sale possibilities. Industry of gum has been overheated also. The whole range of 
consumer durables such as washing machines, vacuum cleaners, radio apparatuses, 
were confronted with the problem how to sell the goods. (…) Investment were almost 
stopped” (Ellswort, 1950:496). 
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Graph 1: Real Housing Prices and Banking Crisis
Source: Rogoff, K-Reinhart, C (2008) is the 2007 US. Sub-prime fi nancial crisis so different? An 
 international historical comparison, NBER, working paper No.13761
Graph 2: Current Account Balances /GDP on the Eve of Banking Crisis
Source: Rogoff, K-Reinhart, C (2008) Is the 2007 US. Sub-prime fi nancial crisis so different? An 
 international historical comparison, NBER, working paper No.13761
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Bearing in mind all that we have stated so far, we dare propose the following 
hypothesis : credit–debt fi nanced consumption and investment (high leverage) 
contribute to hyper absorption in an economy before an economy faces an economic 
downturn. Insuffi cient demand, therefore, is a consequence of both a previously 
overheated economy and a consequent drop of MEC. Once the MEC drops to a low 
level, interest rate must follow the suit. As long as MEC is higher than interest rate (i) 
investments are profi table. Once investment becomes unprofi table, asset prices are 
endangered and expectations fall apart. Factories close down and we get a drastic fall 
in consumption both with: investment and personal. Depression follows.
3. Keynes on economic crisis and business cycle
Keynes was very much concerned with economic crises because he was afraid of 
such socio-economic changes which could eventually lead to development of a 
completely different type of society – socialism. Keynes explained economic crises 
as crises of insuffi cient demand but not in such a way as theoreticians of under-
consumption had done before him. Investment consumption plays a decisive role in 
Keynes’ economic system. Investment consumption must compensate for insuffi cient 
personal consumption. Investment consumption (spending) could be infl uenced by 
monetary policy and interest rate policy. However, there is a tendency for marginal 
effi ciency of capital to decline. Marginal effi ciency of capital declines due to: over-
supply of capital that is over-supply of goods, continuing price increase during the 
prosperity phase of a business cycle, and an increase of cost of production at the 
same time. 
Keynes’ view was that the decline of marginal effi ciency of capital is the main cause 
of economic crises, i.e. e. that it provokes a trade cycle. “By a cyclical movement 
we mean that as the system progresses in, e. g. the upward direction, the forces 
propelling it upwards at fi rst gather force and have a cumulative effect on one another 
but gradually lose their strength until at a certain point they tend to be replaced 
by forces operating in the opposite direction…. we mean also that there is some 
recognizable degree of regularity in the time-sequences and duration of the upward 
and down-ward movements… There is, however, another characteristic of what we 
call the Trade Cycle which our explanation must cover if it is to be adequate; namely, 
the phenomenon of the crisis - the fact that the substitution of a downward for an 
upward tendency often takes place suddenly and violently, whereas there is, as a 
rule, no such sharp turning-point when an upward is substituted for a downward 
tendency.”(Keynes, 1964:322)
Thus, according to Keynes, prosperity suddenly changes the face and violently 
converts into a crisis. The market mechanism does not function the other way around 
so quickly, if it does at all automatically. 
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Crises are a consequence of suddenly declining marginal effi ciency of capital. “The 
later stages of the boom are characterized by optimistic expectations as to the future 
yield of capital-goods suffi ciently strong to offset their growing abundance and their 
rising cost of production and, probably, a rise in the rate of interest also. It is in the 
nature of organized investment markets, under the infl uence of purchasers largely 
ignorant of what they are buying and of speculators who are more concerned with 
forecasting the next shift of market sentiment than with a reasonable estimate of 
the future yield of capital-assets, that when disillusion falls upon an over-optimistic 
and over-bought market, it should fall with sudden and even catastrophic forces” 
(Keynes, 1964:314).
“At the outset of the slump there is probably much capital of which the marginal 
effi ciency has become negligible or even negative. But the interval of time, which 
will have to elapse before the shortage of capital through use, decay and obsolescence 
causes a suffi ciently obvious scarcity to increase the marginal effi ciency, may be a 
somewhat stable function of the average durability of capital in a given epoch. If the 
characteristics of the epoch shift, the standard time-interval will change” (Keynes, 
1964:316).
In addition Keynes underlines that duration of a slump has a defi nite relationship to 
the ‘normal rate of growth in a given epoch’ (Keynes, 1964:318). 
In times of slump, assets are sold off. Goods are sold off regardless of prices. A 
decline of marginal effi ciency of capital badly affects propensity to consume both 
by lowering investment drastically and downsizing companies. “Serious drop 
in marginal effi ciency of capital also tends to affect adversely the propensity to 
consume. For it involves a severe decline in the market value of Stock Exchange 
equities. Now, on the class who take an active interest in their Stock Exchange 
investment, especially if they are employing borrowed funds, this naturally, exerts a 
very depressing infl uence…With a ‘stock-minded’ public as in USA today, a rising 
stock market may be an almost essential condition of a satisfactory propensity to 
consume; and this circumstance, generally overlooked until lately, obviously serves 
to aggravate still further the depressing effect of a decline in the marginal effi ciency 
of capital.”(Keynes, 1964:318) Crises cannot be softened by lowering interest 
rate. “I conclude that the duty of ordering the current volume of investment cannot 
safely be left in private hands,” concluded Keynes in his ‘General Theory’ (Keynes, 
1964:320). 
According to Keynes, crises represent the process of capital depreciation. The 
process of depreciation of the value of capital creates a precondition for capital 
shortage and thus for an increase in its marginal effi ciency. A crisis can hardly be 
avoided or made softer automatically by the automatic functioning of market forces. 
Under such circumstances the policy of relatively high interest rate increase could 
be particulate destructive. Keynes did want to prevent crises and save capitalist’s 
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system. Therefore it is clear why he pleads for an expansive fi nancial policy during 
the stage which precedes the crisis. He wants to convert the boom into a lasting 
quasi-boom. However, he was aware of class reality in capitalist society. Therefore, 
Keynes concluded his book by the following words: “Is the fulfi llment of these 
ideas a visionary hope? Have they insuffi cient roots in the motives which govern 
evolution of political society? Are the interest which they will thwart stronger and 
more obvious than those which they will serve?”(Keynes, 1964:383)
What Keynes really had in mind pointing out to the need for changes in society is not 
too hard to detect if one carefully reads ’The General Theory’ throughout. Keynes, we 
believe, demanded such changes in the socio-economic system which remind us of 
today louder claims of those who would like to guide the development of our present 
society in the direction of creation of what might be called a ’civil society’. A civil 
society requires co-existence of three economic sectors: private sector, public sector 
and the sector of civil economy. In fact, the questions arise whether development of 
such a society could lead to a post-capitalist type of society, and should an animal 
spirit be replaced by the ideas of the Commons and how such a society might be 
constructed. 
4. Keynes’ economic mechanism
One of the building blocks of Keynes’ economic system is MEC. It is interesting to 
note that the term MEC is more complex than the term MPC (marginal productivity 
of capital). Moreover, Keynes expressed doubt whether capital should be correlated 
with productivity. If such a remark is correct, then a serious question arises: where 
does profi t come from if capital has nothing to do with productivity? This intriguing 
and far reaching issue is why we have paid a special attention to an in-depth analysis 
of Keynes’ economic mechanism. Namely, contemplating about productivity of 
capital, Keynes wrote that it was “much more preferable to speak of capital as 
having a yield over the course of its life in excess of its original cost, than as being 
productive. For the only reason why an asset offers a prospect of yielding during its 
life services having an aggregate value greater than its initial supply price is because 
it is scarce… If capital becomes less scarce, the excess yield will diminish without its 
having become less productive - at least in the physical sense” (Keynes, 1964:213)
Keynes here joins a big party of three: Smith, Marx and Schumpeter, who held 
that capital did not have productivity and subsequently did not produce profi t. “I 
sympathize, therefore, with the pre-classical doctrine that everything is produced 
by labor, aided by what used to be called art and is now called technique, by natural 
resources which are free or cost a rent according to their scarcity or abundance, and 
by the result of past labor, embodied in assets, which also command a price according 
to their scarcity or abundance. It is preferable to regard labor, including of course, 
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the personal services of the entrepreneur and his assistants, as the sole factor of 
production, operating in a given environment of technique, natural resources, capital 
equipment and effective demand…. This partly explains why we have been able to 
take the unit of labor as the sole physical unit which we require in our economic 
system, apart from units of money and time” (Keynes, 1964:213) May we conclude 
that lack of productivity of capital has turned Keynes’ attention to the second factor 
of production-labor?
Keynes’ economic mechanism was created by Keynes in order to fi ght against 
depression. The mechanism is more easily understood if one tries to draw a parallel 
with both the process and manner of functioning of national economies in the XIX 
century. 
According to Keynes, the economy was able to perform well at that time due to the 
facts that “during the nineteenth century, the growth of population and of invention, 
the opening-up of new lands, the state of confi dence and the frequency of war over 
the average of (say) each decade seem to have been suffi cient, taken in conjunction 
with the propensity to consume, to established a schedule of the marginal effi ciency 
of capital which allowed a reasonably satisfactory average level of employment to 
be compatible with a rate of interest high enough to be psychologically acceptable to 
wealth-owners. There is evidence that for a period of almost one hundred and fi fty 
years the long-run typical rate of interest in the leading fi nancial centers was about 
5 per cent, and the gilt-edged rate between 3 and 31/2 per cent; and that these rates 
of interest were modest enough to encourage a rate of investment consistent with an 
average of employment which was not intolerably low”(Keynes, 1964:308).
Analyzing the last 150 years, Keynes noticed that ‘wage units’ were increasing. 
But, at the same time, productivity of labor was increasing too. Convergence of 
these factors permitted stability of prices to exist throughout this period. Keynes 
underlined: “Today and presumably for the future the schedule of the marginal 
effi ciency of capital is, for a variety of reasons, much lower than it was in the 
nineteenth century. The acuteness and the peculiarity of our contemporary problems 
arise, therefore, out of the possibility that average rate of interest which will allow 
a reasonable average level of employment is one so unacceptable to wealth-owners 
that it cannot be readily established merely by manipulating the quantity of money. 
So long as tolerable level of employment could be maintained on average for one, 
or two, or three decades merely by assuring adequate supply of money in terms of 
wage-units, even the XIX century could fi nd the way. If this was our only problem 
now – if a suffi cient degree of devaluation is all we need today, we would certainly 
fi nd a way… To return to our immediate subject, the long-run relationship between 
national income and the quantity of money will depend on liquidity-preferences. 
And the long-run stability or instability of prices will depend on the strength of the 
upward trend of the wage-unit (or, more precisely, of the cost-unit) compared with 
the rate of increase in the effi ciency of the productive system.”(Keynes, p.309)
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By quoting extensively from Keynes’ book, we wish to turn the attention of the reader 
to one of the most important but, we believe, still often least understood elements 
of the entire Keynesian system and mechanism: that is to the ‘wage -unit’ or, put 
more simply, the role which the cost of labor (wages) have in the whole process of 
socio-economic reproduction. We would say that the entire complexity and strength 
of Keynes’ economic thought is based on this category and its proper understanding. 
MEC derives its strength from a relation between productivity of labor and labor 
costs. 
Besides, we would like to propose a hypothesis that the essentially same relationship 
between marginal productivity of labor and marginal costs of labor constitutes the 
fundamental basis of a classical and neo-classical economic thought.
Having the ‘wage-unit ’as the basis of the system, Keynes built his ‘castle’, whose 
main building blocks were: marginal effi ciency of capital, interest rate and propensity 
to consume. These building blocks had to be laid on the foundations called the wage-
unit. Therefore, it is clear why Keynes, at the very beginning of his book, sought 
to defi ne fundamental accounting categories of his system. To this end Keynes 
suggested the introduction of two accounting units: money value and quantity of 
employment (Keynes, 1964:245).
Proceeding in the same direction and in order to make the analysis as simple as 
possible, Keynes converted complex labor into simple labor. Simple labor is a 
basic accounting unit, whereas complex labor is multiplied simple labor. The unit 
which measures quantity of employment Keynes entitled ‘labor-unit’. The monetary 
expression of a labor unit he calls ‘wage-unit’. Therefore, if (E) denotes total amount 
of money available for wages, and if (W) is wage-unit, bearing in mind that (N) 
represents quantity of employment we have:
E= NW
If we try to interpret Keynes categories differently, we may, possibly, say that a 
wage-unit could be comparable to the cost of labor employed. Within such a context 
a wage-unit could and should be related to both productivity of labor and money 
wage. Every move to increase money wage above productivity of labor, that is, to 
increase the costs of production, causes infl ationary effects and decreases demand 
for labor at the same time. The relationship between money-value of wages and 
productivity of labor, keeping in mind the state of unchanged technology, leads the 
economy towards full employment only insofar as wages lag behind an increase of 
productivity of labor. 
The relationship between wage-unit (real wage), and marginal productivity of labor 
is one of the most fundamental relationships, as far we are able to understand, of 
the neo-classical school of economic thought. According to the rules of the game of 
the neo-classical economy, demand for labor increases as long as marginal revenue 
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outstrips marginal cost of production, or (which is almost the same) until marginal 
productivity of labor does not equate with marginal cost of labor , or until marginal 
productivity of labor becomes equal to real wages. Demand for labor is determined 
by both factors: marginal productivity of labor and marginal cost of labor.
With respect to the most essential part of neo-classical economics Keynes did not 
retreat at all! 
Therefore, one can say that the Keynesian revolution is much less of a revolution 
but more of an interventionist anti-defl ationary mechanism. With regard to the same 
essential moment of neo-classical economics, Keynes accepts one of the axioms of 
Marx economics which is differentia specifi ca of capitalist production. Labor power 
is sold today, not with a view of satisfying, by its service or by its product, the personal 
needs of its buyer. His aim is augmentation of his capital, production of commodities 
containing more labor than he pays for, containing therefore a portion of value that 
cost him nothing, and that is nevertheless realized when the commodities are sold. 
Production of surplus value is the absolute law of this mode of production. Labor 
power is only saleable in so far as it preserves the means of production in their 
capacity of capital, reproduces its own value as capital, and yields in unpaid labor a 
source of additional capital…
Wages, as we have seen by their very nature, always imply the performance of a 
certain quantity of unpaid labor on the part of the laborer. Altogether, irrespective of 
the case of a rise in wages with a falling price of labor, such an increase only means 
at best a quantitative diminution of the unpaid labor that the worker has to supply. 
This diminution can never approach the point at which it would threaten the system 
itself. An increase of price of labor resulting from accumulation of capital implies 
the following: the price of labor keeps on rising as long as its rise does not interfere 
with the progress of accumulation.
We consider this remark and causality very essential for all brands of economics 
thought, whether it is neo-classical economics, Keynesianism, Post-Keynesians, 
Monetarism, Supply- Side economics, or Rational-expectations school. The remark 
seems to express the very same relationship from the microeconomic sphere of 
economic activity emphasized defi nitely as an axiom by all schools of thought as 
a relationship between marginal productivity (revenue) of labor and marginal cost 
(wage) of labor. But, to differentiate himself from classical economists (the same is 
valid in comparison to the neo-classical economists), Keynes constructed the ‘point’ 
by applying monetary policy in order to make a difference between ’money value‘ 
of labor cost and ‘real’ wages.
When real wages (marginal cost of labor) exceed marginal productivity of labor, 
investment activity decreases, demand for labor declines and supply of labor 
outstrips demand for labor - unemployment increases. Supply of labor and demand 
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for labor could be brought into the equilibrium again through the interplay of supply 
and demand forces which is supposed to produce a decrease of money wages. 
Keynes’ fear from a worldwide defl ation originated just at this point. He was afraid 
of Gibson’s paradox not in the sense of infl ation, but in the sense of defl ation and its 
attendant effects. Defl ation caused by decline of wages could provoke defl ationary 
expectations. A deeper defl ation could, in turn, lead to further decrease in prices 
and ever-increasing supply of unemployed labor. A crisis, i.e. e. depression becomes 
unavoidable. In the book ‘Treatise on Money’ (while Keynes still was a neoclassical 
economist) he wrote: “the market interest rate declines but not as quickly as is 
necessary to match with the natural rate of interest, therefore leading to de-stimulation 
of profi t which, per se, leads to further defl ation and price decrease. If that happens, 
our present system of capitalist individualism will be substituted by far-reaching 
socialism.”(Hadjimichalakis, 1982:346). 
In times of crisis, preferences towards liquidity strongly increase. Keynes called 
such a preference - liquidity trap. The economy is in a state of stalemate. Mass 
unemployment follows. The so-called ‘Pigou’ effect is insuffi cient to bring in 
investment and production again. Similarly, as much as infl ationary expectations can 
stimulate consumption, defl ationary expectations can stave off consumption due to 
the fact that consumers expect lower and lower prices. 
Bearing in mind the effects of the liquidity trap and being afraid of socialism, Keynes 
wanted to prevent wages from further decline. Keynes created the thesis about the 
real life existence of fi xed (infl exible) money-wages and a possibility of fl exible real 
wages. Under the circumstances of infl exible money wages, infl ation can cause the 
same effect as defl ation can cause under circumstances of a decline of money wages. 
We would like to introduce the following thesis as the essence of Keynes’ economic 
mechanism: real wages should be decreased by increasing infl ation in order to propel 
the economy up from the state of defl ation (depression). As stated before, the building 
blocks of Keynes’ economic mechanism are: consumption, marginal effi ciency of 
capital and interest rate. By increasing money supply, with money demand being 
constant, or by varying relationship between money supply and monetary demand, 
Keynes infl uences: consumption, marginal effi ciency of capital (infl uencing both: 
revenue and costs) and interest rate. Ever decreasing marginal effi ciency of capital 
requires ever decreasing interest rate in order to keep wealth-owners in the fi eld 
of investment instead of stimulating them to proceed with the process of portfolio 
selection and substitute bonds for production.
Stressing the essence of his work, Keynes underlined that ‘the volume of employment 
in equilibrium depends on (1) the aggregate supply function, (2) the propensity to 
consume and (3) the volume of investment. This is the essence of the General Theory 
of Employment. (Keynes, 1964:17)
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“For every value of (N) there is a corresponding marginal productivity of labor in 
the wage-goods industries; and it is this factor which determines the real wages. The 
volume of employment in equilibrium is, therefore, subject to the condition that (N) 
cannot exceed the value which reduces the real wage to equality with the marginal 
distillate of labor. This means that not all changes in (D) are compatible with our 
temporary assumption that money-wages are constant. Thus it will be essential to a 
full statement of our theory to dispense with this assumption.”(Keynes, 1964:29)
It means that Keynes had fl exible wages, just as neo-classical economists. Money-
wages can even increase, but real-wages must lag behind the increase of labor 
productivity. Keynes substituted the drop of nominal wages and fear of defl ation by 
decreasing real wages and intentionally ‘producing’ infl ation.” If the reduction of 
money-wages is expected to be a reduction relative to money-wages in the future, 
the change will be favorable to investment, because as we have seen above, it will 
increase the marginal effi ciency of capital, whilst for the same reason it may be 
favorable to consumption.”(Keynes, 1964:29)
Keynes formulated a thesis which even today has signifi cant relevance, especially 
for those countries which have to follow the rules infl icted upon them by the IMF. 
Keynes wrote: “To suppose that a fl exible wage policy is a right and proper adjunct 
of a system which on the whole is one of laissez-faire is the opposite of the truth. It is 
only in a highly authoritarian society, where sudden, substantial, all-round, changes 
could be decreed that a fl exible wage-policy could function with success. One can 
imagine it in operation in Italy, Germany or Russia, but not in France, the USA or 
Great Britain.”(Keynes, 1964:269).
Further, Keynes wrote: “In particular, it is an outstanding characteristic of the 
economic system in which we live that, whilst it is subject to severe fl uctuations 
in respect of output and employment, it is not violently unstable. Indeed it seems 
capable of remaining in a chronic condition of sub-normal activity for a considerable 
period without any marked tendency either towards recovery or towards complete 
collapse. Moreover, the evidence indicates that full, or even approximately full, 
employment is of rare and short-lived occurrence.”(Keynes, p.269)) Such a state of 
economic system Keynes has observed in practice. It is not system which cannot be 
changed. 
Full employment in an economy, which neo-classical economists take for granted, 
is an exception. It is not the rule and hardly can be. Keynes’s task was to fi gure out 
such a system’s parameters which can be consciously managed in order to guide 
the economy successfully towards the level of full employment and far away from 
economic crises. Therefore, we would like to nominate the Keynesian economics as 
an anti-defl ationary, anti-crisis, demand-managed economic policy. Reminding us 
often of Marx’s thought, it is not surprising that Keynes spoke about the necessity 
of substituting the capitalist way of production by the society embracing to a greater 
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extent elements of social solidarity and ethics. Keynes thought: “Moreover, the 
richer the community, the wider will the gap between its actual and its potential 
production tend to be; and therefore the more obvious and outrageous the defect of 
the economic system… A wealthy community will have to discover much ampler 
opportunities for investment if the saving propensity of its more wealthy members 
is to be compatible with the employment of its poorer members… But worse still, 
not only is marginal propensity to consume weaker in a wealthy community, but, 
owing to its accumulation of capital being already larger, the opportunities for 
further investment are less attractive unless the rate of interest falls with suffi cient 
rapidity.”(Keynes, 1964:249)
A major factor that stimulates production is profi t. In deciding about production, an 
entrepreneur wishes to maximize profi t. Therefore: “It follows that in given situation of 
technology, resources and factor cost per unit of employment, the amount of employment, 
both in each individual fi rm and industry and in the aggregate, depends on the amount of 
the proceeds which the entrepreneurs expects to receive from the corresponding output. 
Entrepreneurs will endeavor to fi x the amount of employment at the level which they 
expect to maximize the excess of the proceeds over the factor cost… Now if for a given 
value of (N) employment the expected proceeds are greater that the aggregate supply 
price there will be an incentive to entrepreneurs to increase employment beyond (N) 
and, if necessary, to increase costs by competing with one another for the factors of 
production, up to the value of (N) for which (Z) has become equal to (D). Thus the volume 
of employment is given by the point of intersection between the aggregate demand 
function and the aggregate supply function; for it is at this point that an entrepreneur’s 
expectation of profi t will be maximized “(Keynes, p. 31)
When an economy reaches the level of full employment investments are equal to 
saving; money supply equals money demand, whereas marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost. Goods’ markets and capital markets are in equilibrium. The economy 
is in a stand-still condition. Marginal profi t equals zero. Any resumption of the 
production above that point ‘produces’ loss for an entrepreneur. Eventual fi nancial 
injection by a state in order to create necessary demand becomes contra productive. 
Stagfl ation comes on horizon. Thus, the stock of capital and the level of employment 
must decrease to such an amount which is necessary for a community as a whole, to 
be impoverished enough in order to get aggregate saving to zero point and society to 
face lack of capital again. “Thus, for a society such as we have supposed, the position 
of equilibrium, under conditions of laissez-faire, will be one in which employment 
is low enough and the standard of life is suffi ciently miserable to bring saving to 
zero.”(Keynes, 1964:25)
Simply speaking, both the abundance of goods supply as well as abundance of capital 
supply makes additional production unprofi table. Overproduction of goods and 
attractive profi t do not go hand in hand. In the long run, capital must not be abundant 
factor of production if an economy wants to keep marginal effi ciency of capital at the 
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level which is at least as high as interest rate (Keynes, 1964:218). “At the outset of the 
slump there is probably much capital of which the marginal effi ciency has become 
negligible or even negative. But the interval of time, which will have to elapse before the 
shortage of capital through use, decay and obsolescence causes a suffi ciently obvious 
scarcity to increase the marginal effi ciency, may be a somewhat stable function of the 
average durability of capital in a given epoch. If the characteristics of the epoch shift, 
the standard time-interval will change.”(Keynes, 1964:316).
Finally, one important remark concerning Keynes’ economics needs to be recalled 
and remembered. Namely, in the article “The Balance of Payments of the USA 1946”, 
Keynes admitted that the classical knowledge in economics has certain permanent 
truths with high role in economics. “In those things there are invisible strengths that 
can be called the invisible hand driving an economy into equilibrium.” (Hutchison, 
1981:122-123) Keynes was a brilliant economist who did want to preserve his own 
economic system-capitalism. Therefore, he invented state intervention as a remedy 
against depression in his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. 
However, once he discovered that stagfl ation threatens as soon as the country reaches 
full employment, he retreated back into invisible hands.
5. Closing observations
Keynes’ economy attempts to cure depression, caused by a drop of MEC. In an 
overheated economy, capital becomes a superabundant factor of production 
confronted with a lack of profi table investment. 
A drop of MEC leads to factory closure, causing rising unemployment and a consequent 
drop of personal consumption. New relations between capital and labor must be 
established. Labor must become cheaper factor of production. Consequently, insuffi cient 
demand results out of structural transformation of an economy. However, insuffi cient 
demand is not a cause of economic crisis. Insuffi cient demand is a consequence of 
economic crisis. The main cause of an economic crisis is a drop of MEC.
Depression requires a pro infl ationary economic policy. The role of the state 
becomes highly important in keeping demand increasing. However, demand 
managed economic policy sooner or later brings about full employment and infl ation 
including stagfl ation .An obvious case in point is economic development since the 
Second World War until the end of the 1960s.At the level of full employment of an 
economy, expansive fi nancial policy contributes to stagfl ation. Stagfl ation cannot be 
considered as a lasting solution of crisis. It may only buy time in search for proper 
economic and political solution for a society.
At present the globalised world economy and economies of the most developed 
countries are faced with both fi nancial and structural crisis. The Keynesian economics 
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is static as long as the state of technology and structure of economy is concerned. 
Therefore, we can conclude that in the long run and for a successful solution of world 
economic crisis, the world needs a new social fabric to be developed and followed 
by a suitable economic paradigm particularly in the process of globalization of the 
world economy...
New times ask for a new economic and social solution. Are the Commons an 
alternative solution? 
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Keynes i ekonomska kriza: neka preispitivanja
Dragoljub Stojanov1
Sažetak
U radu čitamo Keynesovu “Opću teoriju zaposlenosti, kamate i novca” iz kuta 
glavnih uzročnika ekonomske krize. Uspoređujemo Keynesov pristup krizi s 
pristupima uglednih ekonomista. Držimo da je po Keynesu pad marginalne 
efi kasnosti kapitala glavni uzročnik ekonomske krize i depresije, te da je taj pad 
nezaobilazna posljedica funkcioniranja kapitalističke tržišne ekonomije. Ovakav 
zaključak se značajno razlikuje od stavova uglednih suvremenih ekonomista koji 
drže da je nedostatna potražnja glavni uzročnik krize. Međutim, mislimo da 
nedovoljna potražnja nije ništa drugo do konzekvenca pregrijane ekonomije 
suočene s padom MEC-a. Sukladno tome, kriza se ne može spriječiti ekspanzivnom 
fi nancijskom politikom. Keynes je u zadnjoj godini svoga života odstupio od svoje 
ideje prezentirane u “Općoj teoriji…” i za sebe izjavio da više nije “kejnizijanac”. 
Mislimo da se ozbiljne sustavne, institucionalne kao i strukturne promjene moraju 
dogoditi u razvijenim zemljama kako bi se svijet mogao učinkovito boriti sa 
sadašnjim i budućim krizama.
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